Congressional Investigations:
IMPORTANCE OF THE FACT-FINDING PROCESS
GEORGz MEADERt

HE INVESTIGATIVE POWER of the Congress is the means
through which Congress may, if it has the mind to do so, reassert
the policy-making authority intended to be vested in it by the
drafters of the Constitution.
Our national economy has developed amazingly in our rather brief
national history of a century and a half, but our national legislature
has failed to keep pace with the demands upon it for the development
of sound national policies and programs in a modern, complex and
mechanized society. This weakness in the Congress has resulted in the
delegation to the executive branch of the government of vast legislative
authority. Legislation frequently is drafted in the departments or bureaus
and presented to the Congress as an administration "must" bill. Loyal
administration committee chairmen or committee members are expected
to force the passage of such a bill with a minimum of amendments. This
weakness also has induced Congress to announce broad objectives in general terms, then create boards or commissions with extensive but looselydefined authority to accomplish these objectives. The net effect of this
weakness on the part of Congress is that national policies are not originated and determined by the representatives of the people, but for the
most part are originated in, then spelled out by, the executive branch of
the government. This method of legislating is not in the interest of true
democracy.
If this trend continues, with Congress becoming weaker and the executive branch of the government becoming stronger, the adoption of national policies through elected representatives will be a mere fiction. When
that time arrives the equilibrium designed by those who drafted our Constitution will have been upset, and the protection of our citizens, through
the system of checks and balances, from abuses of public power will have
vanished. Equilibrium will be restored between the executive and the
legislative branches only when Congress so equips itself that it can indet United States Representative (R., 2d Dist., Mich.). Formerly counsel for the TrumanMead Committee and the Fulbright Committee of the United States Senate.
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pendently, and in its own right, originate and adopt national policies,
expressed in sufficient detail and in unambiguous terms, and which, in the
judgment of the Congress, are in the best interest of the country.
I know of no means whereby Congress can assert its authority over national policies except through the expansion and improvement of its investigative power. In the field of debate, facts and logic are the only effective weapons. Control of the facts is control of the ultimate result. A Congress which is poorly equipped to gather facts, to sift them and make certain of their reliability, is a weak Congress. A Congress which lacks an
effective fact-finding instrument is at the mercy of the executive branch
of the government whose two million employees can gather information
and, through omission and inclusion, through coloring and slanting, can
support any program the administration cares to advance. There is power
in facts. To decide without knowing the facts is certain to lead to error and
unsupportable positions.
August 7, 1944,President (then Senator) Truman, in announcing on the
floor of the United States Senate his resignation as Chairman of the Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, said:
In my opinion, the power of investigation is one of the most important powers of
the Congress. The manner in which that power is exercised will largely determine the
position and prestige of the Congress in the future. An informed Congress is a wise
Congress; an uninformed Congress surely will forfeit a large portion of the respect

and confidence of the people.
The days when Webster, Clay, and Calhoun personally could familiarize themselves
with all the major matters with respect to which they were called upon to legislate
are gone forever. No Senator or Representative, no matter how able or diligent, can
himself hope to master all the facts necessary to legislate wisely.
The accomplishments of the Truman Committee-and I am referring now to the
other members of the committee and its staff, rather than to myself-present an
example of the results that can be obtained by making a factual investigation with a
good staff. Similar accomplishments can be made by other special committees, as
well as the standing committees of the Congress, and I particularly urge upon the
Senate that it be liberal in providing ample funds for the prosecution of proper investigations. The cost of a good investigation is negligible when compared with the
results which can be obtained.'
No reference to the investigative power of Congress can be found in the
Constitution, yet its existence is well established.* Before our nation was
born, the English Parliament and the colonial legislatures exercised investigative powers.2 The power of Congress to "send for persons and
Consult McGeary, Historical Development, page 425 supra.
go Cong. Rec. 6747 (x944).
2 Landis, Congressional Power of Investigation, 4o Harv. L. Rev. 153, 159
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papers" is said to be a necessary adjunct to legislative power, since it en3
ables Congress to inform and enlighten itself before enacting laws.
The basis for implying the existence of the investigative power of Congress furnishes the guide to its proper exercise as well as the direction of
its development into a more useful instrument of a democratic system of
government. In our modern, complex national economy, with its intricate
and multitudinous interrelationships, regulations and controls can no
longer be adopted by simple, broad generalities but must be based upon
thorough knowledge of the detailed facts, the conflicting special interests
and the general public interest. The effects of proposed legislative action
may thus be intelligently calculated, wise policies decided upon, and enactments stated in clear and unambiguous terms.
Primarily what Congress requires to expand and strengthen its investigative activities is the will to do so. Possessing the power to appropriate,
Congress can spend on its own activities such sums as it believes necessary
to discharge properly its policy-making function. In the preparation of
this article, I sought to learn what information existed to show, for various
periods in this nation's history, the size of investigative staffs employed by
the Congress.
The only immediately available comparison is that in 1944 the combined professional and clerical staffs of all the committees of both the
House of Representatives and the Senate numbered 521, while in i9 5 o-in
the Second Session of the 8ist Congress-the total was 614. Of the latter,
290 were professional people and 324 were clerical. This information, al-

though sketchy, indicates:
First, that in the past six years, there has been no pronounced expansion in investigative staffs. This is particularly so when it is remembered
that the Legislative Reorganization Act of 19464 authorized four professional and six clerical positions for each committee.
Second, committee staffs, considered as a whole, are small in relation to
the tremendous responsibilities of the Congress, since they amount, even
including clerical personnel, to about one staff member for each member
of Congress.
It might be said that two things are prerequisite to more intensive investigation: first, the will to investigate, and, second, the staff. With respect to the will to investigate, there probably has been no dearth of resolutions offered by individual legislators throughout the years, urging that
this or that phase of our national activity be investigated. As is the case
3McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927).
4 6o Stat. 812 (1946).

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW

with legislative bills, many of these resolutions never get beyond the stage
of reference to a committee and, indeed, some of them may not have been
seriously pressed by their sponsors. A study of the history of such resolutions would be interesting and might disclose reasons why Congress, in the
past, failed to develop its investigative activities so as to keep pace with
the very rapid growth and development of our national economy.
It is suggested that one reason for the lack of investigative activity is
that efforts to look into matters which might embarrass the administration have been suppressed by committee chairmen and other influential
legislators friendly to the administration. A further explanation is that it
may have seemed to legislators that there is presently so much demand
upon their time for legislative work and for service to their constituents
that they are reluctant to assume the additional burden of extended inquiries. A still further reason might exist in the reluctance of some legislators to appoint investigative staffs for fear that the credit and publicity
attendant upon an investigation might go to the hired investigator rather
than to the legislator. It appears to me that none of the foregoing possible
reasons for the reluctance of Congress to expand its investigative activities have any basic validity.
Congressmen and senators should be friendly and co-operative with the
executive branch of the government. But they should never lose sight of
the fact that under our Constitution their responsibility is to the electors,
and that they are sworn to exercise their independent judgment in enacting policies in the public interest. Undue subservience to the executive departments and agencies, who, through the use of public money appropriated to them, frequently have been able to lobby effectively, is out of harmony with the basic constitutional philosophy of the separation of powers.
Lack of time is no valid excuse for failure to investigate. The importance of sound, factual knowledge, as a basis for legislation, is so great
that other activities of a legislator must give way to the development of
salient facts, without which an intelligent and wise policy cannot be determined. Through organization and delegation of functions, supervised and
controlled by the legislators, the fact-finding job can be performed by
subordinates without excessive drain on the personal time of the legislator.
One need only to reflect momentarily on the wording of statutes which
authorize the President to perform certain acts, which he, in turn, redelegates to the two million or more employees in the federal government, to
realize that the drains on the personal time of the individual legislator can
be lessened if he is provided with adequate assistance.

THE FACT-FINDING PROCESS
Neither should there be any competition for publicity and credit. This
matter should clearly be within the control of the legislator and the committee, since the right to discipline subordinates for the issuance of statements to the press is inherent in the control of the committee over its staff.
In fact, it is unsound for the responsibility for statements of policy, or,
statements of fact resulting from investigative work, to be delegated to
one who is not directly responsible to the electorate. Of course, it is necessary for a legislator or committee to rely upon the work of committee investigators, but whatever is done is the act of the legislator and not the
subordinate. The head of any organization cannot shirk responsibility for
the discharge of functions vested in him.
The failure of Congress to acquire adequate investigative staffs is difficult to justify. One suggested reason is that, although Congress appropriates billions of dollars to executive departments, it is very niggardly
when spending money on itself, for fear of retaliation by the electorate.
I cannot say whether indiscriminate propaganda has originated in the
executive branch of the government, with the purpose of curbing congressional activity and maintaining the power of the executive branch over
legislation. Neither can I say whether the press, with or without any
malicious intent, emphasizes and exaggerates any mean or low qualities
which may appear in congressmen and senators. These may provide some
basis for the fears of individual congressmen that the expenditure of any
substantial sum of money on Congress itself might result in their subsequent defeat at the polls. But, in my judgment, this is far from a wellfounded reason for Congress' failure to expand its investigative activities.
I believe that if Congress properly presented its case to the public, efforts to place its action in an unfavorable light would fail. I believe the
temper of the people is such that a curb on the executive power through
the more effective exploration of specific federal activities would be popular under present conditions. I believe the people could readily understand
that the expenditure of a few million dollars on the strengthening of Congress and its means of obtaining information about public affairs could
well result in the saving of billions of dollars in the operation of the executive branch of the government.
Instances of nepotism, kick-backs and other reprehensible activities on
the part of individual congressmen in the past, which have been so well
publicized, might mitigate against public acceptance of an expanded staff
for Congress. For this reason, it is extremely important that individual
legislators refrain from using for their personal gain any funds provided
for the discharge of their public functions. Also, it is important that Con-
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gress itself call attention to such instances when they occur and discipline
members who disregard their public trust.
In the selection of investigative staffs, it is important that extreme care
be exercised. Persons should be chosen for their unquestioned loyalty to
the Congress (it is an undesirable practice to borrow personnel from the
executive branch of the government), for their care in exploring questions
which may be submitted to them for investigation, for their impartiality,
for their discretion, and for their diligence. The success of an investigation
probably depends more upon the quality of the personnel conducting it
than upon any technique, precepts or rules which can be stated.
I can visualize no way Congress can be induced to expand and improve
its investigative activities except through a natural growth resulting from
competent and successful investigations. It seems to me that investigations which enjoy wide public acceptance, and bring deserved credit to
those conducting them, may well awaken the interest of other legislators
in initiating investigations, and, at the same time, enjoin upon them a
high level of statesmanship in their conduct. Positions on investigative
staffs should be made sufficiently attractive so that men of ability can
afford to accept them. Properly-developed investigations can not only
provide Congress with factual information necessary to intelligent decisions, but can also test the arguments for and against a particular course
of action.
When legislation comes to be based more upon studies of fact and less
upon generalities, emotions and prejudices, our system of government by
the people through elected representatives will have proved itself workable in a modern, complex society.

